Regulation
BIS Releases Rule Targeting Remote Access to Advanced AI Chips

Key PointsThe rule targets remote computing abroad to close the overseas data-center loophole in…
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- The rule targets remote computing abroad to close the overseas data-center loophole in chip controls.
- Linked data centers and indirect model-training access both count toward the licensing threshold.
- Existing data centers serving covered companies must obtain a license within 90 days of the effective date.
The U.S. Commerce Department’s Bureau of Industry and Security released an interim final rule on November 16, 2026, aimed at stopping Chinese companies and other restricted entities from accessing advanced American AI computing through overseas data centers. Its central licensing threshold is more than 12 million aggregate TPP.
Under the rule text, a license would be required when a person knowingly exports, reexports or transfers covered items for a data center anywhere in the world that provides or will provide that level of computing access to companies headquartered in Macau or a Country Group D:5 destination, including China, or whose ultimate parent is headquartered there. Aggregate TPP is the sum of total processing performance across the covered integrated circuits or commodities. License applications under the data-center end-use control will be reviewed case by case.
BIS said the rule was written at the direction of the Treasury Department and National Security Council and is intended to prevent remote-computing arrangements in third countries from circumventing existing physical-shipment controls. The on-display document leaves its Federal Register publication date, effective date and comment deadline as placeholders, so it does not establish a calendar date for the requirements to take effect.
Linked Facilities and Intermediaries Fall Within Scope
The threshold can be reached at one data center or across linked data centers. Those include digitally or physically connected facilities that share resources, balance workloads and replicate data as a unified whole, bringing distributed infrastructure into the same capacity calculation.
The control also covers indirect access. A data-center customer outside Country Group D:5 can bring a transaction within scope if it trains models for, participates in training models for, or supplies models to a D:5 company.
Exporters and foreign data centers are expected to conduct know-your-customer checks covering direct and indirect ownership or control by Macau or D:5 persons. A data center’s refusal or inability to provide sufficient verification information is a red flag that presumptively supplies the knowledge triggering the prohibition unless the exporter resolves it before proceeding.
Compliance continues after the original shipment. Changing covered equipment from a non-prohibited data-center use to a prohibited one counts as an in-country transfer requiring authorization. For shipments made without authorization because the exporter lacked knowledge of a prohibited end use, the exporter must tell the recipient that such a later change requires BIS authorization. Data centers already providing significant compute to covered companies before the rule’s publication must obtain a license within 90 days of its effective date to continue, or face future export restrictions.
Commercial Recommender Exception and Destination Controls
The prohibition does not apply when computing access is exclusively for a commercial recommender system and the required information is submitted to BIS for sharing with the End User Review Committee. The exception covers systems exclusively designed and used to rank, filter or suggest commercial products, services or content. It excludes systems that generate novel text, images, audio, video, software or other content, including recommendation products that incorporate such models. The submission must identify the covered company, report the sum of TPP provided and describe the due diligence establishing exclusive recommender use.
The rule separately adds license requirements for covered advanced-semiconductor exports, reexports and transfers to or within Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand and Brazil, which Commerce identifies as presenting a higher-than-normal diversion risk. Applications will be reviewed case by case, including consideration of each destination’s export-control regime and enforcement coordination with BIS.
Transactions for ultimate consignees or end users headquartered in the United States, or whose ultimate parent is U.S.-headquartered, are excluded from those five-destination requirements only if the exporter meets new reporting duties. Monthly reports must identify transaction parties and parents, destinations and end users, product classifications, names and stock-keeping units, TPP, quantities and transaction dates. Reports are due by the first business day of the month following the transactions they cover.
Foundry Changes and AI Diffusion Rescission
The rule narrows the routes by which front-end fabricators and outsourced semiconductor assembly and test companies can overcome a presumption that applicable advanced logic chips from certain non-approved or non-authorized designers fall under the advanced-chip classification. Designers located in, or with ultimate parents headquartered in, specified D:1, D:4 or D:5 destinations or those five destinations lose that eligibility.
At the same time, the rule removes the former worldwide license requirement imposed for regional-stability reasons on the covered items and recasts coverage through destination and end-use controls. It formally rescinds regulations implementing the Biden-era AI Diffusion Rule, which was never enforced; BIS announced the rescission in May 2025. That removes the model-weights control and its foreign-direct-product rule, the AI Diffusion country tiers, the Artificial Intelligence Authorization and Low Processing Performance license exceptions, and the Data Center Validated End User Authorization.
Commerce’s stated rationale is that large-scale advanced computing can support military and intelligence activities, including weapons development, cyber-espionage, targeted cyber disruption, algorithmic theft and weaponized disinformation. The practical consequence is a compliance regime focused on ultimate users of computing power, aggregated capacity across facilities and later customer arrangements that can change the regulated end use.












